高等经济研究院教师论文被国际权威经济学期刊接收发表

2024年08月06日

近日，东北财经大学高等经济研究院Jin-yeong SOHN副教授与蔚山大学Dooseok JANG助理教授合作的两篇论文被经济学领域权威期刊 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 相继接收发表。

第一篇论文题目为“On the Effectiveness of Leading by Example in Public Goods Games”。尽管越来越多的实验经济学文献研究领导力，但对领导力的理论分析相对较少。该论文研究了互惠个体之间进行的公共品博弈中以身作则的有效性。“以身作则”博弈（LBE）是一个两阶段博弈，其支付结构和经典的自愿贡献机制（VCM）相同，即领导者先做出贡献决策，随后跟随者在观察到领导者的行动后再做出贡献决策。作者发现，如果人均边际回报率 (MPCR) 足够高，LBE比VCM更能有效地引致对公共品的贡献。然而，如果MPCR较低，VCM比LBE更有效。该研究还进行了比较静态实验检验。

第二篇论文题目为“Modeling Sacrifice”。最近的研究表明，一个人对他人的互惠取决于他人所作牺牲的总额。该论文提出了一个将牺牲的概念包括在内的互惠模型，牺牲在这里被定义为选择某个行动时放弃的收益。该模型保留了现存互惠模型的许多理想性质，同时捕捉了互惠心理的细微差别。在该模型中，随着他人牺牲的增加，一个人互惠的动机也随之增加。可以证明，在两人博弈中，在那些自利偏好下不是纳什均衡的互惠均衡中，本文的模型增强了互惠动机。

 

 

Associate Professor Jin-yeong SOHN's Two Papers Accepted for Publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

 August 6, 2024

Jinyeong SOHN, Associate Professor of IAER@DUFE, had his two papers accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization in August, 2024. The two papers are all co-authored with Dooseok JANG, an Assistant Professor at the University of Ulsan.

 

The title of the first paper is "On the Effectiveness of Leading by Example in Public Goods Games". Authors note that, despite the growing interest in leadership in the experimental literature, theoretical analyses of leadership have received relatively limited attention. This study investigates the effectiveness of leading by example in public goods games among reciprocal agents. The "leading-by-example" game (LBE) is a two-stage game with the same payoff structure as the classic voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), in which a leader first makes a contribution decision, followed by the followers who make a contribution decision upon observing the leader's move. They find that, if the marginal per capita return (MPCR) is sufficiently high, LBE is more effective than VCM at inducing contributions. However, if MPCR is low, VCM is more effective than LBE. An experimental test of the comparative statics is conducted.

 

The title of the second paper is "Modeling Sacrifice". Recent evidence suggests that a person's reciprocity toward others depends on the amount of sacrifice made by others. We develop a reciprocity model that incorporates the concept of sacrifice, defined as the payoff forgone when choosing an action. Our model retains many desirable properties of the existing reciprocity models, while capturing the nuanced psychology of reciprocity. In our model, one's motivation to reciprocate increases in the size of others' sacrifice. In two-person games, it can be shown that our model strengthens reciprocity motivation in reciprocity equilibria that are not Nash equilibria under selfish preferences.