高等经济研究院教师论文被国际权威经济学期刊接收发表

2022年09月01日

2022年8月22日，东北财经大学高等经济研究院助理教授赵书辰与加州大学圣克鲁斯分校Daniel Friedman教授，斯塔万格大学Jean Paul Rabanal副教授、Olga A. Rud副教授合作的论文“On the Empirical Relevance of Correlated Equilibrium”被经济学领域权威期刊Journal of Economic Theory 接收发表。

该论文研究在没有外生协调信号的条件下，能否实现高效相关均衡。自适应动态领域的理论研究表明此问题的答案是肯定的，本文作者通过实验室实验对此进行了验证。在著名的斗鸡博弈中，作者观察到实验被试的行为在一些实验组中接近非对称的纯策略纳什均衡，而在另一些实验组中作者观察到合作行为。在一个与石头—剪刀—布和猜硬币游戏相近的博弈中，作者观察到实验被试的行为接近一个相关均衡，且比唯一的纳什均衡更高效。自适应动态的参数估计和模拟捕捉到了大多数观测到的参与者间的异质性和动态规律。结果表明，缺少外生信号的相关均衡具有实证意义，但其限制范围比一些研究者认为的范围更为局限。

Assistant Professor Shuchen ZHAO's Paper Accepted for Publication in Journal of Economic Theory

 September 1, 2022

Shuchen ZHAO, IAER Assistant Professor, had his paper accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Theory on August 22, 2022. Entitled "On the Empirical Relevance of Correlated Equilibrium", the paper was co-authored with Daniel Friedman, Professor at University of California Santa Cruz, and Jean Paul Rabanal and Olga A. Rud, Associate Professors both at University of Stavanger.

 

The paper studies whether an efficient correlated equilibrium can emerge with the absence of exogenous coordinating signals. Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which the authors test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, authors observe subjects' behavior that is close to the asymmetric pure Nash equilibrium in some treatment groups, and in other treatment groups we observe collusive play. In a game resembling rock-paper-scissors or matching pennies, authors observe subjects' behavior close to a correlated equilibrium that is more efficient than the unique Nash equilibrium. Estimates and simulations of adaptive dynamics capture much of the observed heterogeneity across player pairs as well as dynamic regularities. The results show that correlated equilibrium without any exogenous signal indeed has empirical relevance, but within narrower limits than some researchers might have guessed.