我院教师论文被国际权威经济学期刊接收发表

2021年03月22日

3月14日，我院助理教授张翠玲与新加坡管理大学经济学院Takashi Kunimoto副教授合作的论文“On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms”被经济学领域权威期刊Social Choice and Welfare 接收发表。

该论文旨在探讨公共物品供给问题中满足激励兼容性和个人理性的机制。大多数传统文献假设私有信息存在于既定闭区间，本文则假设私有信息存在于离散集合。本文的主要贡献是通过离散化私有信息，运用线性规划的数学方法构建满足激励兼容性和个人理性的预算盈余最大化机制。本文分为贝叶斯实施和主导战略实施两部分。在贝叶斯实施中，本文证明了当且仅当预算盈余最大化机制的盈余为正时，存在一种满足贝叶斯激励相容性、中期个人理性和预算平衡的机制。然而，随着人口规模达到无穷大，在满足贝叶斯激励相容性、中期个人理性和预算平衡的任何机制中，提供公共物品的概率将收敛到零。与贝叶斯实施不同，本文在主导战略实施中考虑主导策略激励相容性和事后个人理性。通过运用相似的线性规划方法，本文在主导战略实施中也获得了与贝叶斯实施相似的结论。此外，本文说明了某些现有文献中的结论其实并不需要代理人风险中性这一假设。总之，本文既改进了传统文献中已有的研究成果，也获得了在一般模型以外的新结论。

Assistant Professor Cuiling ZHANG's Paper Accepted for Publication in Social Choice and Welfare

March 22, 2021

Cuiling ZHANG, IAER Assistant Professor, had her paper accepted for publication in Social Choice and Welfare on March 14, 2021. Entitled "On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms", the paper was co-authored with Takashi KUNIMOTO, Associate Professor of Economics at Singapore Management University.

This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types. The main contribution of this paper is the characterization of the budget-surplus maximizing mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality that applies to a finite discretization over the standard model. Making use of the proposed budget-surplus maximizing mechanisms, we show that some known results do not need the agents' risk neutrality, whereas some others do rely on the agents' risk neutrality in a subtle manner.

Furthermore, we improve upon some known results and obtain new results which do not exist in the standard model.