Lying for Efficiency or Fairness?

15:40-17:00, Monday, March 24, 2025

I-206, Boxue Building

Dr. Jaimie W. Lien is a University Distinguished Professor at the Center for Economic Research, Shandong University. She earned her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, San Diego in 2010. Specializing in Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, and Microeconomics, her research has been published in prestigious journals such as Nature Communications, PNAS, American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), Economic Journal, and Games and Economic Behavior.

The lies of individuals holding positions of influence in society can result in significant consequences for the distribution of resources. A relationship between lying behavior and social preferences has often been proposed in explaining patterns of lying aversion. However, studies have seldom directly examined the relationship between different types of social preferences and the corresponding lying behaviors. We assess individuals' preferences over social allocations along with their lying tendencies in the analogous scenarios, using a novel multinomial version of a 'mind cheating game', which allows different degrees of lying and is independent of social image and reputation concerns. Our study allows us to observe how preferences over fairness and efficiency are associated with the willingness to lie for one's self and others. Selfish and spiteful lies are prevalent among those with strong spiteful preferences in the allocation task, while those subjects with efficiency-oriented preferences tend to tell efficient lies on behalf of others. However, among those with a strong preference for fairness in allocations with own-payoff consequence, lying on behalf of fairness concerns is less apparent. Altogether, the empirical patterns suggest that individuals with a strong preference for efficiency in such scenarios are more likely to lie for fairness concerns, while those with a strong fairness preference may be more likely to lie out of self-interest.

For more information of the seminar, scan the following QR code(s) to join Tencent QQ group (904 544 292) or WeChat group named "IAER Seminar (5)", please.

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(QR code is valid until March 30, 2025)