Bayesian communication games with networks: A revelation principle

15:30-17:00, Thursday, October 26, 2023

I-206, Boxue Building, DUFE


Dr. Yongchuan Qiao is now an Associate Professor in School of Management and Economics at University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. He earned his Ph.D. in economics from National University of Singapore in 2017. His research interests include game theory, microeconomic theory and network theory. He has his papers published in Journal of Economic Theory.

We study Bayesian communication games with information networks (digraphs), by which players may have additional information about their neighbors' types and messages received. We provide a full characterization of the revelation principle by transitive networks---i.e., the digraphs that are closed under the directed-link transitivity. More specifically, we show that any equilibrium of any Bayesian communication game can be represented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism if the underlying network G is a transitive digraph. This gives rise to a well-defined notion of G-communication equilibria, which is composed of a convex polyhedron of incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanisms under a network structure. Our approach is applicable to a plethora of revelation principles discussed in the literature.

For more information of the seminar, scan the following QR code(s) to join Tencent QQ group (904 544 292) or WeChat group named "IAER Seminar (4)", please.



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(QR code is valid until 26/10/2023)