Presenting Objects for Random Allocation

15:30-17:00, Friday, October 27, 2023

I-206, Boxue Building, DUFE


Dr. Liu is now an Assistant Professor of Economics at East China Normal University. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from Singapore Management University in 2017. His research interests include Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design. He has his papers published in Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Mathematical Economics, etc.

For random allocation, whether a desirable rule exists hinges on the domain of agents' preferences, whose formation is affected by how objects are presented. We hence propose a model studying how to present objects so that the induced preference domain allows for designing a good rule. Motivated by practices in reality, we model the objects as combinations of several attribute values and a presentation of objects concerns a choice of presenting attributes and a ranking of them. Agents are assumed to formulate their preferences in a lexicographic manner according to the given presentation. We show that, the domain of preferences induced by a presentation allows for a strategy-proof, efficient, and envy-free rule if and only if the presented attributes are conditionally binary. Under two technical conditions on the number of objects, this result still holds when envy-freeness is weakened to equal treatment of equals.

For more information of the seminar, scan the following QR code(s) to join Tencent QQ group (904 544 292) or WeChat group named "IAER Seminar (4)", please.



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(QR code is valid until 26/10/2023)