Costly Persuasion by A Partially Informed Sender


15:30-17:00, Friday, October 28, 2022


Tencent Meeting(Meeting ID:605 688 721)



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Dr. Shaofei Jiang is a postdoctoral fellow at the Hausdorff Center for Mathematics and the Institute for Microeconomics at the University of Bonn. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests are in information economics and game theory. His recent research studies how information is acquired by and communicated among economic agents with conflicts of interests.








I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. I microfound the cost of an experiment via a Wald's sequential sampling problem and show that it equals the expected reduction in a weighted log-likelihood ratio function evaluated at the sender's belief. I focus on equilibria satisfying the D1 criterion. The equilibrium outcome depends on the relative costs of drawing good and bad news in the experiment. If bad news is more costly, there exists a unique separating equilibrium outcome, and the receiver unambiguously benefits from the sender's private information. If good news is sufficiently more costly, the single-crossing property fails. There exists a continuum of pooling equilibria, and the receiver strictly suffers from sender private information in some equilibria.

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