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  • On the Empirical Relevance of Correlated Equilibrium



    20190717134635.jpg

    Daniel Friedman, Jean Paul Rabanal, Olga A. Rud, Shuchen Zhao

     

    Published : August, 2022

     

    JEL Code: C72; C73; C92

     

    URL to this Article: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105531

     

    Abstract

    Absent coordinating signals from an exogenous benevolent agent, can an effificient correlated equilibrium emerge? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is close to the asymmetric pure Nash equilibrium in some treatments, and in other treatments we observe collusive play. In a game resembling rock-paper-scissors or matching pennies, we observe time average play close to a correlated equilibrium that is more effificient than the unique Nash equilibrium. Estimates and simulations of adaptive dynamics capture much of the observed heterogeneity across player pairs as well as dynamic regularities


    Keywords

    Correlated equilibrium; Laboratory experiment; Adaptive dynamics

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