高等经济研究院谯涌川副教授的两篇论文在国际权威学术期刊在线发表

2026年07月24日

2026年7月，东北财经大学高等经济研究院谯涌川副教授的两篇论文分别在经济学国际权威期刊 Games and Economic Behavior 和 Economic Theory 在线发表。

第一篇论文“Weak* Dominance”论文发表于 Games and Economic Behavior，谯涌川为通讯作者。论文在策略式博弈中提出了一种新的占优概念——弱*占优（weak* dominance），用以刻画“边际谨慎理性”的思想：一个理性参与人相信，每个对手的每一个行动都会以正概率被选择。论文证明，一个行动是被弱*占优的，当且仅当它不是任何边际全支撑信念下的最优反应。在此基础上，论文通过一个迭代删除过程（第一轮删除所有被弱*占优行动，其后各轮仅删除被严格占优行动）刻画了 Gul（1996）提出的完美 τ-可理性化（perfect τ-rationalizability）解概念，并在词典式类型结构模型中为该删除过程建立了认知基础。这一研究为博弈论中非均衡精炼概念的分析提供了新的理论工具。

第二篇论文“Bayesian Coalitional Rationality in Games: An Informational Foundation” 论文发表于Economic Theory，谯涌川为通讯作者。论文研究非合作博弈中集体行为的理性基础，指出集体理性行为的信息前提在于集体成员能够考虑其他成员的行为与信念。据此，论文将“贝叶斯集体理性”定义为一种没有任何集体愿意改变的行为模式：即不存在集体层面的共同信念，认为可以通过默契的集体协议实现共同获益。论文给出了一个可能性结果——“贝叶斯集体理性及其共同信念”这一假设在有限模型中可以得到满足（非空）；并进一步证明，在信念丰富性条件下，该假设恰好刻画了贝叶斯集体可理性化（Bayesian coalitional rationalizability）解概念。此外，论文还为参与人对自身类型与策略选择存在不确定性的博弈情形提供了一种新的个体理性概念。该研究为理解博弈中的集体行为与合作现象提供了新的信息与认知基础。

Games and Economic Behavior 和 Economic Theory 是经济学领域，尤其在博弈论与理论经济学领域具有重要影响力的国际权威期刊。这两项研究分别是高等经济研究院教师以东北财经大学为署名单位发表的第18、19篇学校T级别研究成果。高等经济研究院持续深化人才管理与科研组织模式改革，着力建设具有国际视野和竞争力的高水平人才团队，深耕基础理论创新，不断推进理论突破与学术攻关；未来将继续以更高的国际化视野，产出更多扎根中国大地、引领学术前沿的高质量研究成果，助力学校构建中国经济学自主知识体系、高质量推进 “双一流”建设。

Associate Professor Yongchuan Qiao's Papers Accepted for Publication in Games and Economic Behavior and Economic Theory

July, 2026

In July 2026, two papers by Yongchuan Qiao, Associate Professor at the Institute for Advanced Economic Research (IAER) of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (DUFE), were published online in the leading international economics journals Games and Economic Behavior and Economic Theory.

The first paper, "Weak* Dominance," written jointly by Yongchuan Qiao and Professor Xiao Luo of the Department of Economics at the National University of Singapore, is published in Games and Economic Behavior. The paper proposes a new dominance notion in strategic games—weak* dominance—which reflects the idea of marginally cautious rationality: a rational player believes that each of an opponent’s actions is played with positive probability. The paper shows that an action is weakly* dominated if, and only if, it is not a best response to any marginally full-support belief. Building on this result, the paper characterizes Gul’s (1996) solution concept of perfect τ-rationalizability through an iterative elimination procedure (removing all weakly* dominated actions in the first round, and only strictly dominated actions in subsequent rounds), and establishes an epistemic foundation for the procedure in a lexicographic type structure model. This research provides a new theoretical tool for analyzing non-equilibrium refinements in game theory.

The second paper, "Bayesian Coalitional Rationality in Games: An Informational Foundation," written jointly by Yongchuan Qiao, Professor Xiao Luo of the National University of Singapore, and Associate Research Fellow Chih-Chun Yang of the Institute of Economics at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, China, is published in Economic Theory. The paper studies the rationality foundation of collective behavior in noncooperative games, pointing out that the informational precondition for collectively rational behavior is that members of a coalition take into account the behavior and beliefs of others. Accordingly, the paper defines Bayesian coalitional rationality as a mode of collective behavior that no coalition of players wishes to change—that is, there is no coalition-wise common belief that mutual gains can be achieved through a tacit coalitional agreement. The paper establishes a possibility result: the assumption of Bayesian coalitional rationality and common belief of Bayesian coalitional rationality can be satisfied (is nonempty) in a finite model. It further shows that, under a belief-richness condition, this assumption exactly characterizes the solution concept of Bayesian coalitional rationalizability. In addition, the paper offers a novel notion of individual rationality for game situations in which players may be uncertain about their own types and strategy choices. This research provides a new informational and epistemic foundation for understanding collective behavior and cooperation in games.

Games and Economic Behavior and Economic Theory are internationally renowned journals in economics, particularly influential in game theory and theoretical economics. These two studies are the 18th and 19th DUFE Tier-T research outputs published with the DUFE as the affiliation. IAER keeps reforming talent and research management to build competitive, globally minded teams and advance fundamental theoretical breakthroughs. Going forward, it will produce more high-quality, frontier research, helping the university develop an independent body of knowledge in Chinese economics and drive its "Double First-Class" initiative.